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WATSON V. UNITED STATES – THE FICA TAX 
DISPUTE CONCERNING WAGES AND 
DISTRIBUTIONS TO PROFESSIONAL 
EMPLOYEES/OWNERS 
 
by 
 
Richard J. Kraus * 
Joseph DiBenedetto** 
Roy J. Girasa *** 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Individuals and businesses seek to avoid the payment of 
taxes beyond those demanded by the law. In particular, 
incorporated businesses such as closely held corporations, S 
corporations, LLCs, PCs and PLLCs reduce their Internal 
Revenue Code liabilities by distributing their assets as wages to 
employees. At times, however, the employees of these entities 
are also shareholders. In estimating and paying tax liabilities, 
the incorporated businesses may wish to distribute their assets 
to their employee/shareholders as dividends rather than as 
wages in order to avoid tax liability for payments of 
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 Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA)1 taxes and Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)2 liabilities upon employee 
wages. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seeks to ensure that 
the allocation of business distributions as dividends or as 
wages to employees/owners is reasonable and justified by the 
Internal Revenue Code and regulations. 
 
 Watson v. United States3 decision typifies the 
controversy surrounding IRS determinations that corporate 
taxpayers have underpaid FICA and FUTA tax liabilities by 
disguising wages as dividend payments or that the dividend 
payments have been disguised as wages in order to avoid even 
more onerous corporate taxes.4  
 
 This article concentrates upon the particular 
controversy which arises in Watson concerning a professional 
corporation’s liability for paying FICA tax upon dividend 
payments to a professional shareholder-employee who served 
as the corporation’s only director and who authorized the 
dividend payment to himself when, in fact, a more significant 
portion of the dividend should have been paid as wages. At the 
same time, the article examines the entire controversy 
concerning FICA, FUTA and other tax liabilities for 
incorporated businesses, particularly closely held businesses, 
which choose to treat wages as dividends or dividends as 
wages in order to decrease tax liability. The article concludes 
that the Watson decision correctly determined the liability of 
the S corporation for FICA tax and warns that proposed 
legislation setting pre-determined percentages for a 
professional’s wages must be avoided. 
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THE FICA TAX IS A TAX UPON WAGES 
 
 After graduating from college, David Watson became a 
Certified Public Accountant with a Master’s Degree in 
Taxation. In 1996, Watson incorporated his practice as David 
E. Watson PC (DEWPC) of which he was the sole officer, 
shareholder, director and employee; DEWPC elected to be 
taxed as an S corporation. This corporation acted as a partner in 
the accounting firm of Larson, Watson, Bartling, and Juffer, 
LLP (LWBJ). LWBJ allegedly had sufficient cash flow to 
distribute $2000 a month to each partner including DEWPC; 
DEWPC then authorized a payment of $2000 a month to 
Watson as his sole wages of $24,000 for the tax years 2002 and 
2003. But in addition to his salary Watson, by a DEWPC 
decision, received $203,651 as profit distributions from LWBJ 
for 2002 and $175,470 as profit distributions for 2003. The IRS 
investigated these distributions and determined that at least a 
portion of the profit distributions from DEWPC to Watson 
should be treated not as dividends but as wages. The Court of 
Appeals eventually agreed with the District Court that the 
reasonable amount of Watson’s wages should be set at $91,044 
for both 2002 and 2003. The trial court used average billing 
rates rather than Watson’s actual billing rates to determine the 
wage amount. The appeals court upheld the tax deficiency 
judgment against DEWPC. The judgment included unpaid 
employment taxes, penalties and interest amounting to 
$23,431.33.  
  
 IRC section 3121 defines wages as meaning all 
remuneration for employment including the cash value of all 
such items including benefits paid in any medium other than 
cash. As the code regulations indicate,5 wages include salaries, 
fees, bonuses, and commissions on sales and on insurance 
premiums if paid as compensation for employment. The basis 
upon which remuneration is paid is immaterial and includes a 
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percentage of the profits,6 such as the distribution of profits to 
Watson in this case. 
 
 
WAGES ARE REMUNERATION FOR SERVICES 
PERFORMED BY AN EMPLOYEE 
 
  Although Watson argued that DEWPC was distributing 
to him a return on his investment in the accounting 
incorporated business, the critical FICA tax question concerns 
whether the statute and facts indicate that at least a portion of 
the payments made to Watson constituted remuneration for 
services performed by an employee. The Internal Revenue 
Code, Section 3121(d) defines an employee as any officer of a 
corporation or any individual who, under usual common law 
rules, has the status of an employee.7 The Court of Appeals 
cited a series of cases which aided its decision in determining 
Watson’s employee status.  
  
Radtke, S.C. v. United States –Services Actually Rendered Must 
Be Remunerated As Wages 
 
 In Joseph Radtke, S.C. v. United States8the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided that Joseph Radtke 
S.C. a subchapter S corporation of which attorney Joseph 
Radtke was its sole shareholder-employee, was subject to 
Social Security FICA and FUTA taxes upon distributions to 
him. In the tax year 1982, Mr. Radtke received no salary from 
the corporation but received $18,225 in dividends for that year. 
He paid personal income tax on the dividend and the 
corporation also declared $18,225 on its small business 
corporation income tax return. The IRS, with the agreement of 
the District and Appeals courts decided that the dividends were 
wages subject to FICA and FUTA contributions.9 Dividends 
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may not be paid in lieu of compensation for services actually 
rendered. 
 
 
 
Schneider v. Commissioner – Special Scrutiny Cases Include 
Those in Which Employees Are Also Owners  
 
In cases such as the Watson controversy, special and 
intense scrutiny will be given to distributions where the 
corporation is controlled by the very employees to whom the 
distribution is made. Such a lack of arm’s length dealing 
between the corporation and the employee raises suspicion of 
subterfuge concerning the payment of mandated taxes. In 
Charles Schneider & Co. v. Commissioner 10the 8th Circuit 
Court of Appeals faced the other side of the wages/dividends 
controversy: whether wages paid to employees-shareholders 
were reasonable and necessary as business deductions for the 
corporation or dividends subject to more substantial corporate 
taxation upon the entity’s income. The court agreed with the 
IRS and the United States Tax Court that the wages, including 
bonuses, paid  to the employees-owners were not reasonable 
and necessary business expenses11 but were corporate 
dividends.  The court determined deficiency income tax 
liability against Schneider & Co for the 1966, 1967, and 1968 
tax years in the amounts of $23,512.40, $15,333.42, and 
$21,721.05 respectively. The court also held another allied 
furniture corporation liable for deficiencies for those tax years 
in the amounts of $18,130.17, $3,475.46 and $7,365.58.  
 
The facts of this case reveal that Charles Schneider 
organized a number of furniture and upholstering 
manufacturing businesses of which he was the sole or principal 
shareholder. The closely held corporation which Schneider 
directed permitted distributions to a number of other 
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shareholders including himself in excess of the normal amounts 
paid as wages including bonuses to other industry employees. 
The court noted that several factors helped to determine 
reasonableness of compensation: the employee’s qualifications; 
the nature of the work, its size and complexity; a comparison of 
salaried to gross and net business incomes; the prevailing rates 
of compensation for comparable positions in comparable 
concerns and the history of compensation paid in previous 
years. Because this corporation was closely held, special 
scrutiny of all of these factors resulted in the court’s conclusion 
that the companies paid more wages and bonuses to their 
employees than other similar businesses and that the payment 
to some of the employee-shareholders increased even though 
their workload decreased. The court noted finally that the 
bonus agreements were governed by corporation bylaws which 
required the employees to repay their bonuses if they were later 
declared by a court not to be deductible expenses for tax 
purposes.12 It appeared that the corporations’ tax counsel had 
already anticipated a taxability issue. 
 
The Court of Appeals in the Watson decision utilized 
the Schneider reasoning to justify the intense examination of 
the controversy. DEWPC’s distribution to Watson in like 
manner should be subject to close scrutiny: Watson sought to 
declare a portion of his wages as his wholly owned 
corporation’s dividends to him, thereby evading FICA liability, 
but a closer examination of the facts helped to reveal the 
unjustifiable evasion tactic.   
 
Standard Asbestos v. Commissioner – Case Facts Help 
to Determine Tax Liabilities  
  
 In Watson and in all similar controversies, the facts of 
each case will determine whether payments to a shareholder 
are compensation for services rendered or distributions of 
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profits from the business. Standard Asbestos Manufacturing 
and Insulating Co. v. Commissioner13once again describes a 
situation where a closely held corporation was determined to 
have paid excessive unreasonable salaries to three of its 
shareholders and that a pension paid to a deceased 
shareholder’s wife was a distribution of profits and not a 
pension, taxable to her and not deductible by the corporation.  
 
           In Standard, three brother shareholders solely managed 
an asbestos manufacturing and insulating business founded in 
1918 by their father, whose shares upon his death had passed to 
his widow, the brothers’ mother. During the 1920’s and 1930’s 
the Ryder Brother’s received wages below the standard for the 
industry, until about 1937. From this year corporate resolutions 
substantially increase their wages in order to compensate for 
previous low salaries. But for the tax years 1949, 1950 and 
1951 the corporate resolution in question arranged for bonuses 
to be paid to the brothers without referring to the fact that they 
were intended for services rendered in prior years. Pursuant to 
this resolution, each of the brothers was respectively paid the 
sums of $52,232.14, $65,290.17 and $65,289.17 during the tax 
years 1949, 1950 and 1951. The Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue and U.S. Tax Court then determined that for the 1949, 
1950 and 1951 tax years, the sums paid to each of the brothers 
was in excess of a reasonable amount so that tax deficiencies 
were assessed against them for any amounts in excess of 
$42,500.00 for 1949 and $47,500.00 for 1950 and 1951.  
 
The Commissioner and the Court examined extensive 
evidence concerning the salaries of the brothers paid in prior 
years. On December 20, 1937 a corporate resolution directed 
additional payment of wages for the years 1928 to 1930 by 
raising the compensation by 40%; on January 6, 1941 the 
salaries of the Ryder brothers were raised to $11,000 because 
of low salaries paid to them and on January 5, 1942 a corporate 
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resolution, once again, cited prior low salaries and raised the 
brothers’ waged to $20,000. As already stated, however, the 
later corporate resolution in question made no mention of prior 
low salaries. 
 The percentage of the corporation’s net income used to 
pay the salary bonuses also led the Commissioner and the court 
to decide that the salaries were unreasonable. In particular, the 
court noted that the salary bonuses represented a very high 
percentage of the company’s net income during the taxable 
years, while no other officer of the corporation received more 
than $9,000.000 in income during the years in question. The 
court quoted Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner:  
The bonuses given at the end of the year, according to 
the minutes of the petitioner, were based to a large 
extent at least upon the earnings that the company had 
made during the year and its consequent ability to pay. 
In addition to the fact that there were large earnings 
resulting to a greater or lesser extent from the efforts of 
these officers and employees, we cannot escape the 
thought that the distribution of earnings of the company 
had the effect of very substantially reducing the excess 
profit taxes collectible  against the petitioner [emphasis 
added]. 14  
The bonuses were used as a subterfuge to avoid properly due 
corporate taxes. 
 
The salaries paid to competitors in similar businesses 
additionally convinced the Commissioner and the court of the 
unreasonableness of the salary bonuses. The president of a 
competing company offered credible testimony that he 
received a salary of approximately $16,000.00 in 1949 and 
approximately $26,000.00 in 1950 and 1951; the court judged 
his experience and ability to be comparable to that of the tax 
payer company’s officers, the Ryder brothers, and that their 
activities and hours of work were also quite similar.    
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 In addition, the pension paid to Alice D. Ryder, 84 
years old, was not a pension for the founder’s widow but a 
distribution of profits and hence taxable to her. The taxpayer 
Standard Asbestos Company paid to Alice D. Ryder, the 
widow of Willard E. Ryder, deceased, the following pension 
amounts which the company deducted from its taxable income: 
$20,491.08 in 1949, $32,645.08 in 1950 and $32,645.09 in 
1951. The Commissioner and the Tax Court noted that Alice D. 
Ryder’s husband had held 473 ¼ shares of the company’s 500 
shares of stock before his death but had divided them, among 
others, to the three Ryder brothers and to his widow. The 
transfer agreement contained covenants restricting the transfer 
of the stock, and created a pension for Alice D. Ryder so long 
as she held the shares and did not re-marry. The agreement 
contained no references which designated the pension as 
recognition for the past services of her husband. The 
Commissioner, the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals 
reasoned that the pension payments were made for the purpose 
of assuring control over the stock and would not be deductible 
business expenses, but would constitute a distribution of profits 
taxable to Alice D. Ryder. 15     
  
 In regard to the pension paid to Alice D. Ryder, the 
court noted that the corporate resolutions indicated that the 
pension was to assure control over the future alienation of 
shares and was not a deductible business expense but a 
distribution of profits taxable to the corporation.  
 
 Once again, the Court of Appeals used the facts of 
Ryder decision to justify its agreement with the findings of the 
Commissioner and the Tax Court in the Watson controversy. 
The facts of Watson clearly indicate that David Watson 
received at least a portion of DEWPC’s profits as remuneration 
for wages paid for his services. The $24,000 annual salary 
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which he received could not at all recompense him for his 
contributions of skill and work given to the corporation which 
he himself wholly owned.  
 
THE REASONABLENESS CRITERION FOR 
DETERMINATION OF EMPLOYEE STATUS AND 
AMOUNT OF REMUNERATION 
  
The Eighth Circuit Court in Watson noted that the 
Commissioner and the Tax Court had to determine the proper 
basis for treating David Watson as an employee and the 
reasonable amount of salary paid to him for the personal 
services which he actually rendered. Although reasonable 
compensation usually concerns corporate income tax 
deduction, a 1974 IRS Revenue Ruling concerning small 
business corporation dividends paid instead of salaries had 
stated that the concept applies equally to FICA tax cases.16 In 
its ruling, the IRS indicated that the dividend payments of an S 
corporation constituted wages for FICA tax purposes because 
the corporation’s two shareholder-employees performed 
reasonably substantial services for the corporation, but received 
no reasonable wages for those services; in fact no wages at all 
were paid to them. The Service, in response to the revenue 
ruling inquiry, concluded that the dividends were paid as 
reasonable compensation for the reasonably substantial 
services of those shareholder-employees.  
 
In the Radtke controversy mentioned above the attorney 
sole shareholder of an S corporation also received no salary 
and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
conclusions that attorney Radtke had performed reasonably 
substantial services as an employee of the corporation and that 
the so-called dividend payments were clearly reasonable 
remuneration for those services rather than a return of 
investment to a shareholder. 
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Veterinary Surgical Consultants, P.C. v. 
Commissioner17 in like manner decided that a veterinarian tax 
payer, the sole shareholder of a professional S corporation, 
cannot claim that the distributions to him were merely 
dividends which represented a return on his investment. The 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Tax Court and 
Commissioner that a reasonableness criterion must apply to the 
facts of this case to determine the substantiality of work 
performed and the wages paid in relationship to that work.  
Dr. Kenneth K. Sadanaga practiced veterinary medicine 
in Pennsylvania during the tax years 1994, 1995 and 1996. Dr. 
Sadanaga functioned as a full-time employee of Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co. during this time and reported wages from the 
company of $91,212.18 in 1994, $95,851.15 in 1995 and 
$102,031.14 in 1996; the company withheld the necessary 
Social Security taxes from his wages. During the same period, 
however, the Veterinary Surgical Consultants, P.C. S 
Corporation (VSC) paid to Dr. Sadanaga “non-employee 
compensation” of $83,995.50 in 1994, $173,030.39 in 1995 
and $161,483.35 in 1996. Dr. Sadanaga was VSC’s sole 
shareholder and its only officer. All of VSC’s income was 
generated from the consulting and surgical services performed 
by Dr. Sadanaga; he was the sole signatory on the 
corporation’s bank account and handled all of its 
correspondence; he performed substantial services for the 
corporation working approximately 33 hours a week.  
 The Tax Court concluded, and the Court of Appeals 
agreed, that the Commissioner had found overwhelming and 
certainly reasonable evidence that Dr. Sadanaga performed the 
entire substance of the work for the corporation and that the 
distributions in 1994, 1995 and 1996 constituted a reasonable 
compensation for the veterinarian and were subject to FICA 
and even FUTA taxes. The Tax Court noted that the form of 
payments could be but a subterfuge for the reality of their 
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payment and that the intention of receiving the payments as 
dividends or distributions of profits had no bearing on the tax 
treatment of his wages.18 
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the Tax Court 
that the 1978 Revenue Act Section 530 safe harbor provisions19 
do not apply to the facts of this case. It is true that VSC did not 
treat Dr. Sadanaga as an employee for any tax period in 
question but VSC could not reasonably rely on any of the 
following three additionally needed exceptions to the rule that 
Dr. Sadanaga need not be treated as an employee: (a) judicial 
precedent, published rulings, technical advice or a letter ruling; 
(b) past IRS order of the taxpayer; or (c) long standing industry 
practice. The two judicial precedents upon which VSC relied, 
Durando v. United States20 and Texas Carbonate Co. v. 
Phinney 21, did not produce reasonable bases for any exception. 
The Durando decision concerned the treatment of S 
Corporation shareholders as shareholders and would not affect 
a determination that Dr. Sadanaga, although a shareholder, was 
also an employee of VSC22. Texas Carbonate improperly read 
the provisions of Section 530 but properly determined in any 
event that a shareholder-director-manager of a company was an 
employee for federal employment tax purposes.23   
Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner24  also treated the topic of 
reasonableness. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
however, did not agree with the Commissioner and Tax Court 
concerning the reasonableness of the bonus paid to its CEO and 
sole shareholder. 
Elliotts, Inc., the taxpayer, was a closely held Idaho 
corporation which sold John Deere Company equipment and 
services equipment from Deere and other manufacturers. 
Edward G. Elliott was the corporation’s chief executive officer 
and sole shareholder during the tax period in question; he 
always had total responsibility for the business as its manager 
of some 40 employees. The corporation paid Elliott a fixed 
salary of $2000 a month plus a bonus fixed at 50% of its net 
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profits. For the tax years 1975 and 1976, the corporation paid 
Elliott a total compensation of $181,074 for 1975 and $191,663 
for 1976. The Tax Court agreed that the compensations paid 
were unreasonable, but adjusted the Commissioner’s finding to 
seek deficiency assessments of compensation paid in excess of 
$120,000 for 1975 and $125,000 for 1976. 
The Court of Appeals agreed that Elliott obviously was 
an employee of the corporation. He performed the duties of an 
employee as its manager and was reasonably entitled to 
compensation for his services. The appeals court, however, 
remanded the case to the Tax Court on the issue of 
reasonableness of compensation. The court closely examined 
the shareholder-employee problem; it recognized that this 
situation is troublesome because the corporation and the 
shareholder-employee do not deal with each other at arm’s 
length. The Commissioner and the Tax Court, however, must 
determine the proper allocation between compensation paid for 
services rendered and a share of profits distribution not 
deductible by the corporation. The Court observed that IRC 
Section 162(a) (1) permits a corporation to deduct “a 
reasonable allowance for salaries paid for personal services”. 25 
The payments must satisfy the statute’s two-prong test that the 
compensation be in fact reasonable and be made purely for 
services rendered.26  
The Court of Appeals then suggested five criteria to 
determine the reasonableness of compensation paid to Elliott. 
The court noted that a. Elliot’s role as employee in the 
company included 80 hours of work per week as its sole and 
dedicated manager; b. compared to other companies’ 
managers, Elliott did the work of three people compared to 
managers at other John Deere dealers; c. the character and 
condition of the company’s sales, net income and capital value 
revealed the complexity of the business which Elliott managed; 
d. the conflict of interest which exists in the shareholder- 
employee relationship does not prevent Elliott from 
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distributing a bonus to himself despite the close scrutiny which 
must be given to the relationship, provided that an independent 
shareholder would permit a large bonus to Elliott and not view 
the bonus as an impairment of the shareholder’s equity in the 
corporation; e. internal consistency in the distribution of the 
bonus to Elliott existed because, since its incorporation, the 
business had a longstanding, consistently applied  
compensation plan in which it paid to Elliott an annual 
incentive bonus equal to fifty percent of its net profits.  
 
DECISION OF THE WATSON COURT 
 
          Taking all factors and evidence into account, the Court 
of Appeals agreed with the District Court that DEWPC was 
subject to a FICA tax deficiency assessment because the 
wholly owned S corporation had understated David Watson’s 
wages by $67,044.00. The Court reasoned that the following 
assisted in the computation of a reasonable compensation for 
Watson: his superior qualifications as certified public 
accountant, including his advanced taxation degree and 20 
years’ professional experience; his 35 to 45 hour work week 
for LWBJ, which grossed between $2 million and $3 million 
for the tax years 2002 and 2003; the $200,000 distributed by 
LWBJ to DEWPC in both 2002 and 2003 compared to the 
exceedingly low $24,000 annual salary paid to Watson by 
DEWPC. The Court then agreed that, by comparing Watson’s 
qualifications with similar professionals in the market, the 
District Court properly set Watson’s wages at $91,044.27  
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The Internal Revenue Code, IRS publications and the 
decisions described above correctly indicate that the wages of a 
professional such as David Watson should be subject to FICA 
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and FUTA tax liabilities.  Profit or dividend distribution to 
such professionals should not be used as a subterfuge to avoid 
the payment of such taxes, just as the payments of excessive 
salaries or bonuses may not be used to disguise liabilities for 
taxes owed by the corporations themselves. 
 
 It should be noted that the employment tax rules for S 
corporations may be subject to change in that S corporation 
shareholders who significantly participate in the business of the 
corporation may have to treat 70% of their combined 
compensation distributive share as net earnings from self-
employment, and the remaining 30% as earnings on invested 
capital. 28  The Watson and allied decisions are certainly a more 
accurate way of determining tax rules, even though more 
complicated, rather than simplified. 
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